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This article examines the motivations of liberals and conservatives to boycott and buycott. Nine studies demonstrate that
although both liberals and conservatives engage in consumer political actions, they do so for different reasons influenced by their
unique moral concerns: Liberals engage in boycotts and buycotts that are associated with the protection of harm and fairness
moral values (individualizing moral values), whereas conservatives engage in boycotts and buycotts that are associated with the
protection of authority, loyalty, and purity moral values (binding moral values). In addition, the individualizing moral values lead to
a generally more positive attitude toward boycotts, which explains why liberals are more likely to boycott and buycott. Liberals’
greater concern for the suffering of others and unfair treatment makes them more likely to engage in consumer political actions.
Conservatives, in turn, engage in consumer political actions in relatively rarer cases in which their binding moral values are
affected by corporate activity.
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Conservatives and liberals prioritize different moral values
(Haidt and Graham 2007; Haidt and Joseph 2004): liberals
uphold harm prevention and fairness, while conservatives
value authority, loyalty, and purity (Graham, Haidt, and Nosek
2009; Haidt and Graham 2007). These differences shape how
liberals and conservatives view themselves (McAdams et al.
2008) and their social environment (Reyna, Korfmacher, and
Tucker 2005).
This article examines the effect of political ideology on
intentional buying and abstention from buying specific prod-
ucts for political reasons—buycotting and boycotting, respec-
tively. I employ Erikson and Tedin’s (2003, p. 64) definition of
political ideology as “a set of beliefs about the proper order of
society and how it can be achieved” (see also Jost 2006). Con-
servative and liberal ideologies describe a set of norms and
ideals that shape individuals’ thoughts, feelings, and actions
(Jost et al. 2003) and represent a large part of consumers’
identity (Ordabayeva and Fernandes 2018). Recent research
shows that liberals are more likely than conservatives to boy-
cott and to buycott (Endres and Panagopoulos 2017; Jost, Lan-
ger, and Singh 2017), which Jost, Langer, and Singh (2017)
argue stems from liberals’ tendency to question, challenge, and
criticize existing institutions and authorities.
Boycotts and buycotts are not new phenomena; colonists
boycotted British tea in the years preceding the American
Revolution; consumers boycotted Nestlé in the 1970s over its
promotion of baby formula, especially in poor countries; and,
more recently, consumers boycotted Starbucks over its inten-
tion to hire 10,000 refugees. However, the percentage of people
who engage in boycotts and buycotts has increased from 5% in
1974 to 15% in 1999 around the world (Stolle, Hooghe, and
Micheletti 2005), and recent studies estimate the percentage to
be about 30% in the United States. About one in three Amer-
icans report declining to buy a product in the past 12 months for
political reasons, and about one in four Americans report hav-
ing bought a product in the past 12 months for political reasons
(Baek 2010; Copeland 2014; Endres and Panagopoulos 2017;
Jost, Langer, and Singh 2017; Newman and Bartels 2011).
Despite the increased prevalence of boycotting and buycotting,
we still have an incomplete picture of the sociopolitical and
psychological underpinnings of why people do so.
Building on moral foundations theory, this article examines
when and why liberals and conservatives are more likely to
boycott and buycott firms and products. Across nine studies,
I find that these actions are influenced by unique moral
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concerns. Liberals engage in consumer political actions that are
associated with moral values of harm and fairness (individua-
lizing moral values), whereas conservatives engage in con-
sumer political actions that are associated with moral values
of authority, loyalty, and purity (binding moral values). Indi-
viduals of both political persuasions are more likely to boycott
and buycott specific firms and products that oppose or support
their moral concerns. The results also show that liberals’ heigh-
tened tendency to boycott and buycott stems from their greater
endorsement of harm and fairness moral values. The greater
concern for the suffering of others and unfair treatment drives
liberals to extend their moral regard to more permeable groups
and individuals, and increases their support for consumer polit-
ical activism that advances individual rights and well-being.
These findings make five contributions adding nuance to
previous research. First, the results show that the alignment
with specific moral values mediates the effect of political ideol-
ogy on the likelihood to boycott and buycott. Second, this
article uncovers the less frequent cases in which conservatives
engage in boycotts and buycotts: when they perceive deviations
from authority, loyalty, and purity moral values. Third, the
results show that the endorsement of harm and fairness moral
values lead to a more positive attitude toward boycotts, which
explains why liberals are more likely to boycott and buycott in
general. Fourth, in addition to establishing ideological differ-
ences in boycott and buycott and their psychological under-
pinnings, this article tests the effect of political ideology on
political activism by examining participation in political pro-
test. Fifth, this article studies the effect of political ideology
across different samples in the lab and in the field, and with
attitudinal and real actions.
Political Ideology and Consumer
Political Activism
Ideological inclinations can be detected as early as childhood
(Fraley et al. 2012), as they are rooted in intrinsic needs and
motives. According to the uncertainty threat model, conserva-
tism serves a defense function against threats (Jost et al. 2007),
which underlies conservatives’ tendency to justify the system
in power and the status quo (Jost, Nosek, and Gosling 2008); to
hold more rigid cognitive styles (Kruglanski and Webster
1996) and have high uncertainty avoidance tendencies
(Janoff-Bulman 2009; Jost et al. 2003); and to be more sensi-
tive to threats (Jost et al. 2007; Nail et al. 2009), social norms
(Jost et al. 2003), and emotional stimuli (Carraro, Castelli, and
Machiella 2011).
Recent studies have relied on these differences to examine
the role of political ideology in the marketplace. Fernandes and
Mandel (2014) show that conservatives seek more variety in
choices because of their desire to follow social norms. Khan
et al. (2013) show that conservatives prefer national over gen-
eric brands due to aversion to risk and ambiguity. Roos and
Shachar (2013) find that conservatives prefer light and family-
friendly movie genres because of their sensitivity to emotional
stimuli. However, these findings have largely focused on
conservatives’ motivations and choices, leaving liberals’
motivations and behaviors largely untapped. The bias of
describing and focusing on conservatives’ behavior extends
to research in social psychology more broadly (Eitan et al.
2018). To understand liberals’ motivations and how they
compare with conservatives, I turn to moral foundations the-
ory (Haidt and Graham 2007).
Moral Foundations Theory
According to moral foundations theory (Haidt and Joseph
2004), moral judgments are based on five tenets: preventing
harm and protecting others (harm), ensuring a fair distribution
of outcomes (fairness), upholding respect for authority and
hierarchy (authority), promoting group interests and loyalty
(loyalty), and avoiding impure and disgusting things and
actions (purity). Being concerned with the well-being and
protection of individuals’ rights, harm and fairness moral val-
ues are considered “individualizing” moral values. Being con-
cerned with the tightening of individuals into well-ordered
and stable groups, loyalty, authority, and purity moral values
are considered “binding” moral values (Graham, Haidt and
Nosek 2009).
Liberals prioritize individualizing moral values, whereas
conservatives prioritize binding moral values (Haidt and Gra-
ham 2007). These differences shape how conservatives and
liberals view themselves (McAdams et al. 2008) and others
(Skitka et al. 2002), their interactions (Fowler and Kam 2007),
and support for social policies (Reyna, Korfmacher and
Tucker 2005) and campaigns (Winterich, Zhang, and Mittal
2012). In their life narratives, liberals recall events marked
with empathy, harm prevention and fairness, while conserva-
tives recall instances that prioritized respect for authority,
discipline, and group loyalty (McAdams et al. 2008). In the
dictator game, self-identified Republicans distributed out-
comes fairly among in-groups (other Republicans), whereas
self-identified Democrats distributed outcomes fairly regard-
less of group affiliation (Fowler and Kam 2007). In the policy
domain, conservatives protect social hierarchy and attribute
inequality to individual factors such as motivation and disci-
pline (Jost et al. 2003; Pratto and Cathey 2002). Liberals, in
turn, protect vulnerable groups and attribute inequality to
contextual factors such as chance and opportunity (Skitka
et al. 2002). In donation campaigns, conservatives are more
responsive to appeals that emphasize binding values (civic
duty and promotion of social stability and safety), whereas
liberals are more responsive to appeals that emphasize indi-
vidualizing values (helping others and protection of vulnera-
ble others) (Kidwell, Farmer, and Hardesty 2013; Winterich,
Zhang, and Mittal 2012).
The Moral Foundations of Consumer Political Actions
Boycotts and buycotts are specific types of actions in which
consumers use their choices as a way of expressing their social
and policy preferences (Klein, Smith, and John 2004; Newman
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and Bartels 2011). Boycotts and buycotts are voluntary actions
to join a social political movement and may be influenced
by moral values that consumers uphold (Van Zomeren,
Postmes, and Spears 2012). Moral values refer to beliefs
that something is morally right or wrong (Skitka and Mullen
2002) and form a large part of an individual’s identity
(Aquino and Reed 2002; Bénabou and Tirole 2011). Moral
values can justify action aimed to protect and affirm moral
principles (Van Zomeren et al. 2011). Supporters of social
movements have a shared understanding of what is right and
wrong (Graham and Haidt 2012).
According to the motivated view of moral reasoning (Haidt
2001), moral intuitions occur automatically without knowledge
of how they emerge. People know what they consider morally
right or wrong, but they cannot entirely explain why. In addi-
tion, their deliberations for why something is morally right or
wrong often serve to confirm their presuppositions (Graham
et al. 2013; Mercier and Sperber 2011). As a result, intuitive
moral judgments appear as self-evident absolute truths (Haidt
2001) and can motivate individuals to join collective action to
protect sacred values and promote what they believe is morally
right (Koleva et al. 2012; van Zomeren, Postmes, and Spears
2008). The intuitive desire to follow one’s moral priorities
influences a wide range of individuals’ cognitions, emotions,
and behaviors (Haidt 2001). Politicized consumers may engage
in boycotts and buycotts to express their values and influence
how these values are incorporated in companies. Therefore,
conservatives and liberals are expected to engage in boycotting
and buycotting actions, and the moral values they hold will
explain these effects.
H1: Political conservatives (liberals) engage in consumer
political actions that are associated with binding (indivi-
dualizing) moral values.
Boycotts are defined as social dilemmas between the indi-
vidual benefit of consumption and the shared benefit of a
collective refrain from buying (John and Klein 2003; Sen,
Gürhan-Canli, and Morwitz 2001). Similarly, Klein, Smith,
and John (2004) consider boycotts a form of prosocial behavior
intended to help other people than oneself. Boycotters and
buycotters engage in costly actions to benefit others. In addi-
tion, consumers’ intentions to participate in boycotts can result
from the perceived egregious behavior of a firm (Klein, Smith,
and John 2004). When consumers are unfairly treated, they feel
intense emotions (Aquino, Tripp, and Bies 2001; Bougie,
Pieters, and Zeelenberg 2003) and are likely to seek revenge
(Joireman et al. 2013). The quest for fairness is common in
economic relationships (Fehr and Gächter 2000), as in the
marketplace (Bechwati and Morrin 2003), and may extend to
the pursuit of fairness for others who may suffer as a conse-
quence of a company’s actions and policies.
By prioritizing harm and fairness, liberals express concern
toward larger and more permeable groups, including humans,
animals, and even plants, whereas by prioritizing authority,
loyalty, and purity, conservatives express concern toward
well-defined, shared social groups with whom they identify
themselves, be that their family, extended relationships, affilia-
tions, class, or country (Waytz et al. 2019). Liberals morally
disapprove of the harm caused by others and are therefore more
empathic with the suffering of any social group (Crimston et al.
2016). Given liberals’ stronger concern for harm and care, they
may be more likely to engage in boycotts and buycotts that
address some harm caused by a company. Liberals are also
more sensitive to violations of principles of equality and justice
and will therefore be more willing to sacrifice their personal
gain for others’ well-being.
In summary, because liberals prioritize preventing harm and
promoting fairness, they have stronger intentions to participate
in boycotts and buycotts in general. Boycotting and buycotting
actions are more commonly associated with the protection of
individual rights and the promotion of others’ well-being than
with the promotion of system rules and regulations, and the
protection of specific in-group members. Therefore, attitude
toward boycotts will be more strongly related to individualizing
moral values than to binding moral values. This, in turn, explains
why liberals are more likely to engage in boycotts and buycotts.
H2: Consumer political actions are more strongly associ-
ated with individualizing than with binding moral values,
which explains why political liberals, relative to political
conservatives, are more likely to engage in boycotts and
buycotts.
Empirical Plan
Study 1 tests the effect of political ideology on boycotting and
buycotting Nike because of the Colin Kaepernick campaign.
Web Appendix A tests the effect of political ideology on boy-
cotting and buycotting a company given its support or opposi-
tion toward Brexit in the United Kingdom. Study 2 and Web
Appendix C test the effect of political ideology across a range
of consumers’ actual recent boycotting and buycotting actions
and establishes the underlying process of moral foundations.
Study 3 tests the serial mediation process of political ideology
(on boycott and buycott actions) through individualizing moral
values and attitude toward boycott. Study 4 tests the effect of
political ideology around the globe. Study 5 establishes the cau-
sal effect of political ideology by treating conservative and lib-
eral ideals. Study 6 examines how political ideology is related to
political action and protests more broadly. Study 7 tests the
effect using online searches on Google as secondary data. All
studies use established measures (attitude toward boycott and
real boycott action), and diverse participant samples establish
the robustness and generalizability of the effects (see Table 1).
This article broadens the lens on the underlying process
behind the effect of political ideology on boycotting and buy-
cotting by examining the motivation to signal and uphold fun-
damental moral values. The results show that the internalized
moral foundations of liberals and conservatives drive their boy-
cotting and buycotting tendencies. Liberals are more likely to
boycott because of their stronger sensitivity to cruelty, unfair-
ness, and inequality when making moral judgments.
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Conservatives are less prone to boycott and only engage in
boycotts and buycotts in the rarer cases when their binding
moral values are affected.
Study 1: Political Ideology and Nike Boycotts
and Buycotts
Study 1 examines the intention to boycott and buycott Nike
because of its campaign featuring Colin Kaepernick, who pro-
tested against police brutality toward African Americans by
refusing to stand during the national anthem. I expect liberals
to support Nike’s campaign by buycotting its products because
they are more empathic to causes targeting violations of harm
and justice, and I expect conservatives to oppose Nike’s cam-
paign by boycotting its products because they are more con-
cerned with violations of loyalty, authority, and purity.
Method
Two hundred seven American Mechanical Turk (MTurk)
workers participated in the study (Mage ¼ 36 years; 37%
female). Participants answered a multi-item scale of political
ideology (Kidwell, Farmer, and Hardesty 2013; from 1 ¼
“strongly oppose” to 9 ¼ “strongly support” capital punish-
ment, abortion*, gun control*, socialized health care*, same-
sex marriage*, illegal immigration*, and Democrats*, where *
marks reversed items). The items were averaged to compose
the measure of political ideology (M ¼ 4.19, SD ¼ 1.56; a ¼
.75). Higher scores reflect more conservatism.
Participants were then asked to consider Nike’s campaign of
using Colin Kaepernick as a product endorser. To avoid being
more appealing to only one side of the political spectrum, the
questionnaire described the campaign in two versions: “the
company used as a product endorser an athlete who acted in
Table 1. Summary of Studies.
Sample Goal Main Results
Study 1 207 American MTurk
workers
Test the effects of political ideology on
intentions to boycott and buycott Nike due to
the Kaepernick ad
Conservatives and liberals have opposing reactions
to the ad. Conservatives report greater
intentions to boycott, and liberals to buycott,





Test the effects of political ideology on
intentions to boycott and buycott a company
given its support or opposition toward Brexit
Conservatives and liberals have opposing reactions
to a company position toward Brexit.
Conservatives report greater intentions to
boycott (buycott) a company that opposes
(supports) Brexit, and liberals to boycott
(buycott) a company that supports (opposes)
Brexit.
Study 2 385 Worldwide
Prolific Academic
workers
Test the effects of political ideology on
intentions to boycott and buycott in recent
boycotts, and explain their mechanism
Conservatives and liberals have opposing reactions
to conservative and liberal boycotts. Their unique
moral values explain this interaction.
Conservatives (liberals) engage in consumer






Replication of Study 2 with a sample of
Americans
The findings largely replicate Study 2 above.
Conservatives and liberals have opposing
reactions to conservative and liberal boycotts.
Their unique moral values explain this interaction.
Study 3 791 American MTurk
workers
Test the effect of political ideology on attitude
toward boycotts and likelihood of boycotting
and buycotting, and its mechanism.
Liberals are more likely to boycott and buycott in
general because of their greater concern about
the suffering of others and about fair outcome
distribution, which drive a more positive attitude
toward boycotts.
Study 4 224,874 World Values
Survey panelists
Test the effect of political ideology on boycott
tendency with a culturally diverse sample
Liberals report a greater tendency to boycott. This
effect is mediated by variables that serve as
proxies for individualizing values concern.
Study 5 397 Worldwide
Prolific Academic
workers
Test the causal effect of political ideology on
attitude toward boycotts
Participants induced to see themselves as more
liberal are more positive toward boycotts.
Study 6 1,474 Measuring
Morality Project
panelists
Test the effect of political ideology on political
activism, and its mechanism
Liberals report a greater likelihood of having
participated in political protests, and sacralization
of individualizing moral values mediate this effect.
Study 7 107 cities in the
United States
Test the effect of political ideology on Google
searches for “boycott” and “buycott”
Negative effects of conservatism in a given city on
search level for the terms “boycott” and
“buycott” in that area.
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protest against police brutality toward minority groups in the
United States,” or “the company used as a product endorser an
athlete who acted disrespectfully in public toward the flag of
the United States.” Participants were randomly assigned to read
one version and then answered how likely they were to boycott
and to purposefully buy the products of the company (from 1¼
“not at all” to 11 ¼ “very much”; boycott: M ¼ 6.19, SD ¼
3.63; buycott: M ¼ 6.04, SD ¼ 3.45).
Results
I regressed the intention of boycotting and buycotting Nike on
political ideology (higher scores means more conservatism),
which resulted in the expected significant positive effect on
boycotting (B ¼ .61, SE ¼ .16, p < .001) and negative effect
on buycotting (B ¼ .64, SE ¼ .15, p < .001), as shown in
Figure 1. Surprisingly, I observed no interaction between the
version of campaign and political ideology on boycotting (p ¼
.30) and buycotting (p ¼ .62). These results show that conser-
vatives and liberals had opposing reactions to the campaign. In
addition, individuals of both political persuasions had well-
formed opinions about the campaign and did not change their
views according to framing version (being against police bru-
tality vs. disrespectful toward the American flag).
Discussion
Study 1 finds that conservatives and liberals have opposing
reactions to Nike’s campaign. Conservatives reported greater
intentions to boycott Nike, and liberals to buycott Nike, due to
the ad. Web Appendix A shows a conceptual replication by
examining consumer reactions to a firm that supports or
opposes Brexit in the United Kingdom. In summary, liberals
and conservatives engage in boycotts and buycotts that are
aligned with their views. Study 2 aims to generalize these
effects to multiple recent boycotts and examine their
mechanisms.
Study 2: Political Ideology and Willingness to
Boycott and Buycott
Study 2 aims to test the effect of political ideology on boycot-
ting and buycotting across multiple recent boycotts. In addi-
tion, it tests the mechanism for these effects. Consistent with
H1, liberals and conservatives are expected to engage in boy-
cotts and buycotts that are associated with their moral values.
Method
Three hundred eighty-five Prolific Academic workers partici-
pated in the study (Mage ¼ 32 years; 52% female). (Prolific
Academic is an online platform that provides data at least as
accurate as MTurk; Peer et al. 2017.) They answered a single-
item scale of political ideology (from 1 ¼ “extremely left-
wing” to 9 ¼ “extremely right-wing”; M ¼ 4.26, SD ¼
1.54). Participants then answered whether they would boycott,
buycott, or neither boycott nor buycott to 14 conservative boy-
cotts and 14 liberal boycotts in counterbalanced order. I
obtained the list of boycotts by searching for well-known con-
sumer boycotts and categorizing them according to whether
they reflect liberal or conservative values to obtain a balanced
number of conservative and liberal boycotts.
Participants were not told that the boycotts were conserva-
tive or liberal to avoid demand effects or response based on
group association. They were told to consider that they were
customers of those companies and had to decide whether to
boycott or purposefully buy the products of the company
because of the issue. Table 2 lists the issues participants were
asked to consider.
Participants then answered the 22-item version of the moral
foundations questionnaire (Graham, Haidt, and Nosek 2009)
about the extent to which different factors are relevant in their
moral values. Each of the five foundations is assessed with four
items. The questionnaire also included two filler questions:
participants were asked to indicate the extent to which some
actions are relevant when deciding whether something is right
or wrong (1 ¼ “not at all relevant” to 5 ¼ “extremely
relevant”). They evaluated two actions per moral dimension
(e.g., harm: “whether or not someone suffered emotionally”;
fairness “whether or not someone acted unfairly”; ingroup:
“whether or not someone did something to betray his or her
group”; authority: “whether or not someone showed a lack of
respect for authority”; and purity: “whether someone did some-
thing disgusting”). Participants also evaluated the agreement
with specific and contextualized moral judgment statements
(1 ¼ “strongly disagree” to 6 ¼ “strongly agree”) and
responded to two statements related to each moral dimension
(e.g., harm: “compassion for those who are suffering is the
most crucial virtue”; fairness “justice is the most important
































Figure 1. Study 1 results: Boycott and buycott intentions as a function
of political ideology.
Notes: The slopes were obtained from the model estimates. The dashed lines
represent the standard error around the estimates. Political ideology was
measured using the Kidwell et al. (2013) scale, with higher scores indicating
more conservatism.
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to their family members, even when they have done something
wrong”; authority: “respect for authority is something all chil-
dren should learn”; and purity: “people should not do things
that are disgusting, even if no one is harmed”). To obtain the
scores on the individualizing and binding moral values, I aver-
aged the evaluations related to the harm and fairness dimen-
sions (a¼ .80; M¼ 4.34, SD ¼ .63), as well as the evaluations
related to the in-group, authority, and purity dimensions (a ¼
.83; M ¼ 3.35, SD ¼ .73).
Results
I measured boycotting and buycotting in liberal and conserva-
tive boycotts by counting the number of times participants
reported they would boycott the products of a company in
liberal boycotts (M ¼ 6.62, SD ¼ 3.87) and conservative boy-
cotts (M ¼ 1.56, SD ¼ 2.05), and the number of times partici-
pants reported they would buycott the products of a company in
liberal boycotts (M ¼ .96, SD ¼ 2.11) and conservative boy-
cotts (M ¼ 3.87, SD ¼ 3.44).
I then regressed each measure on the single-item scale of
political ideology (higher scores means more conservatism)
and found, as expected, significant negative effects on both
boycotting in liberal boycotts (B ¼ .71, SE ¼ .12, p <
.001) and buycotting in conservative boycotts (B ¼ .71, SE
¼ .11, p < .001), and significant positive effects on both boy-
cotting in conservative boycotts (B ¼ .38, SE ¼ .07, p < .001)
and buycotting in liberal boycotts (B¼ .19, SE¼ .07, p< .01).
These results replicate the previous findings that liberals are
more likely to join liberal boycotts and oppose conservative
boycotts, whereas conservatives are more likely to join conser-
vative boycotts and oppose liberal boycotts. Web Appendix B
shows the effect of political ideology for each liberal and con-
servative boycott.
As expected, political ideology was negatively related to
individualizing moral values (B ¼ .08, SE ¼ .02, p < .001)
and positively related to binding moral values (B ¼ .16, SE ¼
.02, p < .001). I then included the individualizing and the
binding moral values in the model predicting the number of
boycotts and buycotts, controlling for political ideology. The
results show that individualizing moral values predicted
boycotting in the liberal boycotts (B ¼ 2.26, SE ¼ .28, p <
.001) and buycotting in the conservative boycotts (B¼ 1.88, SE
¼ .25, p< .001), but not boycotting in the conservative boycotts
(p ¼ .16) or buycotting in the liberal boycotts (p ¼ .12). In
contrast, the binding moral values predicted boycotting in the
conservative boycotts (B ¼ .49, SE ¼ .14, p < .001) and buy-
cotting in the liberal boycotts (B ¼ .44, SE ¼ .15, p < .01), but
not boycotting in the liberal boycotts (p ¼ .68) or buycotting in
the conservative boycotts (p ¼ .20). These results show that
individualizing moral values predict support for liberal
boycotts and opposition for conservative boycotts, whereas bind-
ing moral values predict support for conservative boycotts and
opposition for liberal boycotts. Table 3 describes these results.
I estimated mediation models through PROCESS (model 4;
10,000 samples; 95% confidence intervals; Hayes 2018) to test
Table 2. Study 2 Boycotts.
Company Controversial Issue
Conservative Boycotts
Adidas Adidas has promised to sign Kaepernick to an
endorsement deal if an NFL team signs him.
Bank of America Bank of American announced it would no longer
lend money to gunmakers.
Budweiser Budweiser aired a pro-refugee commercial during
Superbowl 2017.
Gillette Gillette advertised against “toxic masculinity.”
Salesforce Salesforce raised funds for Hillary Clinton.
Nike Nike officially announced Colin Kaepernick as the
face of its new “Just Do It” campaign.
Starbucks Starbucks CEO Howard Schultz opposed efforts to
stop illegal immigration and stated his intention
to hire 10,000 refugees.
Target Target includes gender neutral toilets in its
stores.
Netflix Netflix threatened to abandon the state of Georgia
in protest of a new restrictive abortion law.
Hertz Hertz cancelled discount programs offered to
members of the National Rifle Association.
Nabisco Nabisco moved jobs to Mexico.
Apple Apple refused to helped the Federal Bureau of
Investigation break into the mobile phones of
potential terrorists.
AT&T AT&T supported LGTBQ acceptance in the Boy
Scouts.
Marvel Marvel Studies created superheroes played by
women as well as ethnic and racial minorities.
Liberal Boycotts
L.L. Bean Linda Bean stated support for Trump
BP BP caused an environmental disaster due to oil spill
in the Gulf of Mexico.
Hermès Hermès sells luxury bags and belts using skin from
reptiles.
FedEx FedEx sponsors the Washington football team that
formerly bore a racially offensive name.
Coca-Cola Coca-Cola intimidated union leaders at its factories
in South America.
United Airlines United Airlines allowed paying customers to be
physically removed and accosted after the
company overbooked a flight.
Amazon Amazon was accused of tax avoidance.
Kellogg’s Kellogg’s cereal products contain genetically
modified organisms and glyphosate, the active
chemical ingredient in Monsanto’s Roundup
herbicide.
L’Oréal L’Oréal used animal testing for cosmetics.
Picturehouse
Cinemas
Picturehouse Cinemas refused to negotiate with
staff over demands for a living wage.
Shell Shell caused damage to the environment (in the
Arctic and the rain forest) and has been accused
of human rights abuses (treatment of the Ogoni
population in the Niger Delta).
Tate & Lyle Tate & Lyle was accused of land rights abuses in
Cambodia.
Microsoft Microsoft supported President Trump.
Nestlé Nestlé has been the subject of boycott calls around
the world since the 1970s for its irresponsible
marketing of baby milk formula.
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the indirect effects of political ideology on boycotting and
buycotting in liberal and conservative boycotts. The results
confirm the indirect effects of political ideology through indi-
vidualizing moral values on boycott in liberal boycotts (a ¼
.18, SE ¼ .05, 95% CI ¼ [.289, .088]) and on buycott in
conservative boycotts (a ¼ .15, SE ¼ .04, 95% CI ¼ [.237,
.076]). The results also confirm the indirect effects of polit-
ical ideology through binding moral values on boycott in con-
servative boycotts (a ¼ .08, SE ¼ .03, 95% CI ¼ [.034, .133])
and on buycott in liberal boycotts (a¼ .07, SE¼ .03, 95% CI¼
[.024, .134]).
Discussion
Study 2 shows that liberals support liberal boycotts and oppose
conservative boycotts by being more willing to abstain from
buying products of companies that were subject to liberal boy-
cotts and to purposefully buy products of companies that were
subject to conservative boycotts. Conservatives in turn support
conservative boycotts and oppose liberal boycotts by being
more willing to abstain from buying products of companies
that were subject to conservative boycotts and to purposefully
buy products of companies that were subject to liberal boycotts.
The results also show that the individualizing moral values
explain the liberals’ support for liberal boycotts and opposition
to conservative boycotts, whereas the binding moral values
explain conservatives’ support for conservative boycotts and
opposition to liberal boycotts. Web Appendix C reports a repli-
cation of Study 2 with a sample of American MTurk workers.
Study 3: Political Ideology and Attitude
Toward Boycotts
Study 3 aims to further test the mechanism of the effect of
political ideology by measuring generalized attitude toward
boycotts and actual participation in boycotts and buycotts
(rather than willingness to boycott and buycott specific issues
as in Study 2). According to H2, differences in moral founda-
tions between liberals and conservatives would explain why
liberals are more likely to boycott and buycott in general;
namely, the greater alignment with individualizing moral val-
ues would mediate the effect of political ideology on attitude
toward boycotts, which would further lead to the likelihood of
boycotting and buycotting.
Method
Seven-hundred ninety-one American MTurk workers partici-
pated in the study (Mage ¼ 36 years; 57% female). Participants
answered the same multi-item scale of political ideology as in
Study 1 (Kidwell, Farmer, and Hardesty 2013; M¼ 4.05, SD¼
1.84; from 1 ¼ “strongly oppose” to 9 ¼ “strongly support,”
capital punishment, abortion*, gun control*, socialized health
care*, same-sex marriage*, illegal immigration*, and demo-
crats*, where * marks reversed items; a ¼ .81). Higher scores
reflect more conservatism.
Participants then answered the same 22-item version of the
moral foundations questionnaire (Graham, Haidt, and Nosek
2009) as in Study 2. To obtain the scores on the individualizing
and binding moral values, I averaged the evaluations related to
the harm and fairness dimensions (a ¼ .83; M ¼ 4.37, SD ¼
.75) and the evaluations related to the ingroup, authority, and
purity dimensions (a ¼ .90; M ¼ 3.25, SD ¼ .96).
Next, the attitude toward boycotting scale was adminis-
tered (Sen et al. 2001; a ¼ .93; M ¼ 4.52, SD ¼ 1.47),
which assesses participants’ opinions about boycotting in
four items (“very negative/very positive,” “not at all favor-
able/very favorable,” “very bad idea/very good idea,” and
“not at all useful/very useful”). Participants also answered
whether they have boycotted and buycotted in the past (0 ¼
no, 1 ¼ yes) to compose measures of likelihood of having
boycotted (M ¼ .31, SD ¼ .46) and buycotted (M ¼ .20, SD
¼ .40) in the past.
Results
I logistically regressed the likelihood of having boycotted and
buycotted on the multi-item scale of political ideology (higher
scores mean more conservatism) and found, as expected, sig-
nificant negative effects on both boycotting (B ¼ .186, SE ¼
.045, Wald w2 ¼ 17.15, p < .001) and buycotting (B ¼ .123,
SE ¼ .051, Wald w2 ¼ 5.79, p ¼ .02). These effects were
qualified by a quadratic term (boycotting: B ¼ .119, SE ¼
.019, Wald w2 ¼ 38.50, p < .001; buycotting: B ¼ .054, SE
¼ .021, Wald w2¼ 6.25, p¼ .01). Figure 2 shows the estimates
of the likelihood of boycotting (Panel A) and buycotting (Panel
B). Post hoc comparisons revealed that the effect of political
ideology was negative and particularly strong among partici-
pants on the liberal end of the scale (less than the midpoint 5;
boycotting: B ¼ .72, SE ¼ .10, Wald w2 ¼ 52.60, p < .01;
buycotting: B¼.25, SE¼ .10, Wald w2¼ 6.00, p¼ .01), and
it was marginally positive on the conservative end of the scale
(more than the midpoint 5; boycotting: B ¼ .24, SE ¼ .13,
Wald w2 ¼ 3.17, p ¼ .07; buycotting: B ¼ .30, SE ¼ .16, Wald
w2 ¼ 3.34, p ¼ .07). This confirms that conservatives also
engage in boycotting and buycotting, albeit less strongly than
liberals do.
As expected, political ideology negatively predicted attitude
toward boycotting (B ¼ .248, SE ¼ .027, p < .001). This
effect was also qualified by a quadratic term (B ¼ .039, SE ¼
.012, p ¼ .001). Figure 3 shows the shape of this effect. Post
hoc comparisons revealed that this negative effect was partic-
ularly strong among participants on the liberal end of the scale
(ideology score of less than the midpoint 5: B ¼ .412, SE ¼
.055, p < .001) but not among those participants on the con-
servative end of the scale (ideology score of more than the
midpoint 5: B ¼ .117, SE ¼ .091, p ¼ .20). This finding
shows that the effect of political ideology is mainly driven by
liberals being more favorable toward boycotting, not conserva-
tives being less favorable.
Next, I examined the serial mediation process of political
ideology on boycotting and buycotting through individualizing
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































moral values and attitudes toward boycotting. As in Study 2,
political ideology was negatively related to the individualizing
dimension (B ¼ .14, SE ¼ .01, p < .001) and positively
related to the binding dimension (B ¼ .22, SE ¼ .02, p <
.001). I then included the individualizing and the binding moral
dimensions separately in the model predicting attitude toward
boycotting, controlling for the effect of political ideology. The
results show a significant effect of the individualizing dimen-
sion (B ¼ .41, SE ¼ .07, p < .001) but not of the binding
dimension (p ¼ .86). I then included the attitude toward boy-
cotting scale in the models predicting boycotting and buycot-
ting, controlling for the effects of political ideology and of
individualizing moral values. The results show significant
effects of attitude toward boycotting on both boycotting (B ¼
.746, SE¼ .076, Wald w2¼ 96.24, p< .001) and buycotting (B
¼ .506, SE ¼ .078, Wald w2 ¼ 41.84, p < .001). Table 4
presents these results.
Finally, I estimated serial mediation models through PRO-
CESS (model 6; 10,000 samples; 95% confidence intervals;
Hayes, 2018) to test the indirect effects of political ideology
on boycotting and buycotting likelihood through individualiz-
ing moral values and attitude toward boycotting (political
ideology ! individualizing values ! attitude toward boycot-
ting! boycotting and buycotting likelihood). The results show
indirect effects of political ideology on boycotting (a ¼ .044,
SE ¼ .010, 95% CI ¼ [.065, .027]) and buycotting (a ¼
.030, SE ¼ .007, 95% CI ¼ [.046, .017]) likelihood.
Figure 4 shows each of the estimated paths.
































Figure 2. Study 3 results: Boycotting (panel A) and buycotting (panel B) likelihood as a function of political ideology and its quadratic term.
Notes: The slopes were obtained from the model estimates. The dashed lines represent the standard error around the estimates. Political ideology was measured























Figure 3. Study 3 results: Attitude toward boycotting as a function of political ideology and its quadratic term.
Notes: The slopes were obtained from the model estimates. The dashed lines represent the standard error around the estimates. Political ideology was measured
using the Kidwell, Farmer, and Hardesty (2013) scale, with higher scores indicating more conservatism.
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Discussion
Study 3 shows that greater concern for individualizing moral
values explains the heightened tendency of liberals to boycott
and buycott. The individualizing moral orientation mediated
the effect of political ideology on boycott and buycott likeli-
hood by driving liberals to hold more positive attitudes toward
boycotts. Liberals are more likely to boycott and buycott
because of their greater concern about the suffering of others
and about fair outcome distribution.
Study 4: Political Ideology and Boycotting
Around the World
The preceding studies focus on WEIRD samples (respondents
from Western, educated, industrialized, rich, and democratic
countries; Henrich, Heine, and Norenzayan 2010). The main
goal of Study 4, therefore, is to test the link between political
ideology and boycotting around the world in the World Values
Survey (WVS), which has surveyed representative samples
from a broad sample of countries about their beliefs and opi-
nions since 1981.
Method
Independent variable. The WVS assesses political ideology
using a single item. Participants located themselves on a scale
ranging from 1 ¼ “left-wing” to 10 ¼ “right-wing” (M ¼ 5.70,
SD ¼ 2.38).
Mediator variables. I identified three variables that reflect con-
cern for individualizing moral values, and I recoded them as
follows: approval of human rights movement (1 ¼ “strongly
disapprove” to 4 ¼ “strongly approve”; M ¼ 3.66, SD ¼ .62),
opinion about amount of help for less developed countries (1¼
“too much,” 2 ¼ “about right,” 3 ¼ “too little”; M ¼ 2.53, SD
¼ .61), and extent to which the priority in social policy should
be to increase primary education (1 ¼ “low priority” to 4 ¼
“top priority”; M ¼ 3.39, SD ¼ .73). Although these items are
not perfect proxies, they do reflect concern for harm and
fairness.
Dependent variable. The WVS measures boycott tendency by
asking respondents about whether they have joined or consid-
ered joining boycotts (recoded as: 1 ¼ “would never do,” 2 ¼
“might do,” and 3 ¼ “have done”; M ¼ 1.49; SD ¼ .66). The
questions of political ideology and boycott tendency were
administered in the six waves from 1981 to 2014, and were
available in 92 countries (N ¼ 224,874).
Additional dependent variables. The WVS also measures whether
respondents have done or consider doing the following actions
using the same recoded scale as for boycotts: attend lawful/
peaceful demonstrations (M ¼ 1.70; SD ¼ .74), join unofficial
strikes (M ¼ 1.37; SD ¼ .61), occupy buildings or factories (M
¼ 1.18; SD ¼ .44), and sign a petition (M ¼ 1.90; SD ¼ .81).












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Control variables. I controlled for individual- and national-level
variables that could be confounded with right-wing orientation.
Namely, I controlled for the Gini coefficient to account for
inequality (M ¼ 35.59, SD ¼ 9.19), income of respondents to
control for economic power (from 1 ¼ lowest step to 11 ¼
highest step; M ¼ 4.68, SD ¼ 2.35), age (M ¼ 40.73, SD ¼
16.00), and gender (male¼ 1, female¼ 2; M¼ 1.49, SD¼ .50).
Results
I constructed a multilevel model, adjusting the intercept of pro-
pensity of boycotting in each nation. The results show an effect
of right-wing orientation and of its quadratic term. Model 1
shows that right-wing orientation is negatively and significantly
related to boycotting (B¼.018, SE¼ .0006, p< .001). Model
2 adds the quadratic effect of right-wing orientation (B ¼ .003,
SE ¼ .0002, p < .001). Post hoc comparisons reveal that this
negative effect is particularly strong among participants on the
liberal end of the scale (ideology score of less than 6: B¼.047,
SE ¼ .001, p < .001) and weaker among participants on the
conservative end of the scale (ideology score of more than 5: B
¼ .007, SE ¼ .001, p < .001). Figure 5 shows this effect, and
Table 5 shows the coefficients of all models.
Model 3 adds the control variables and shows significant
effects of gender (B ¼ .103, SE ¼ .003, p < .001), age (B
¼.003, SE¼ .0001, p< .001), income (B¼ .018, SE¼ .0006,
p< .001), and the Gini coefficient (B¼.0072; SE¼ .003, p¼
.01). Male, younger and wealthier individuals are more prone to
boycott, and boycott is more common in egalitarian countries.
Models 4–6 add the mediators. The mediators have a posi-
tive effect on boycotting: approval of human rights movement
(B ¼ .0699, SE ¼ .0098, p < .001), amount of help for less
developed countries (B¼ .0412, SE¼ .0059, p< .001), and the
extent to which the priority is increase in primary education (B
¼ .0395, SE ¼ .0074, p < .001). They are negatively related to
right-wing orientation: approval of human rights movement (r
¼.076, p< .001, N¼ 12,464), opinion about amount of help
for less developed countries (r¼.055, p< .001, N¼ 39,303),
and the extent to which the priority is to increase primary
education (r ¼ .047, p < .001, N ¼ 17,252).
Finally, I estimated mediation models using PROCESS
(model 4; 10,000 samples; 95% confidence intervals; Hayes,
2018) to test the indirect effects. The results confirm the indi-
rect effects of political ideology on boycott through approval of
human rights movement (a ¼ .0017, SE ¼ .0003, 95% CI ¼
[.0023, .0012]), opinion about amount of help for less
developed countries (a ¼ .0006, SE ¼ .0001, 95% CI ¼
[.0009, .0005]), and the extent to which the priority is to
Total effect: B = −.22***; direct effect: B = 0.001
indirect effect through individualizing moral values: a = −.044, SE = .010, 
95% CI = [−.065, −.027]












Total effect: B = −.08*; direct effect: B = −.06
Indirect effect through individualizing moral values: a = −.030, SE = .007, 
95% CI = [−.046, −.017]







Figure 4. Study 3 results: Individualizing moral values mediate the effect of political ideology on boycotting and buycotting.
Notes: The predictor is measured ideology (Kidwell, Farmer, and Hardesty 2013; higher scores indicate more conservatism). The outcomes are dichotomous
items of participation in boycotts (1 ¼ yes, 0 ¼ no) and buycotts (1 ¼ yes, 0 ¼ no).
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Figure 5. Study 4 results: Boycott tendency as a function of political
ideology and its quadratic term.
Notes: The slopes were obtained from the model estimates. The dashed lines
represent the standard error around the estimates. Political ideology was
measured using a single-item scale from 1 ¼ extremely left-wing to 10 ¼
extremely right-wing. Boycott tendency was assessed by whether respondents
would never join (1), might join (2), or have joined (3) a boycott.
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increase primary education (a ¼ .0006, SE ¼ .0001, 95% CI
¼ [.0009, .0003]).
Web Appendix D shows the effect of political ideology on
the additional dependent variables, which measure the ten-
dency to engage in other forms of political action (attending
lawful/peaceful demonstrations, joining unofficial strikes,
occupying buildings or factories, and signing a petition). They
essentially replicate the results with similar magnitudes. For all
the variables, right-wing orientation has a negative effect, sug-
gesting that liberals are more likely to engage in such actions.
In addition, the quadratic effect is positive and significant for
all the variables, meaning that the negative effect of right-wing
orientation is stronger among those who score at the low end of
the scale—that is, liberals.
Discussion
Study 4 makes four contributions. First, it extends the results to
boycotts around the world, thereby showing that the findings
are not exclusive to WEIRD samples. Second, the effect of
political ideology on boycotting is in part explained by vari-
ables that reflect concern for individualizing moral values. The
study identifies items that capture concern for harm and fair-
ness in the WVS, thus reflecting concern for individualizing
moral values and replicate the results of previous studies.
Third, the analysis is extended to other forms of political
action. The results provide initial evidence that liberals are also
more likely to engage in other forms of political action (Study 6
provides additional evidence that political ideology is related to
political protest more broadly). Fourth, the WVS data cover
boycotts since 1981 and therefore show that the effect is not
restrictive to recent boycotts of the present politically polarized
times.
Study 5: The Effect of Manipulated Political
Ideology
Study 5 tests the causal effect of political ideology on attitude
toward boycotting by manipulating political ideology.
Method
Three hundred ninety-seven participants recruited from Prolific
Academic (Mage¼ 30 years; 45% female) completed the study.
Only complete questionnaires were considered. To manipulate
political ideology, I used the procedure developed by Orda-
bayeva and Fernandes (2018): Participants performed a recall
task in which they described a conversation they had with
someone who was either more conservative or liberal than they
are. The rationale is that by comparing oneself to someone who
is more liberal (vs. conservative), participants would perceive
themselves as being more conservative (vs. liberal), building
on the assumption that the social contrast influences individu-
als’ perceptions of their political identity (Feinberg et al. 2017).
After the recall task, participants indicated their ideology as a



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































“extremely liberal,” and 9 ¼ “extremely conservative”; M ¼
3.90, SD ¼ 1.78).
Participants then answered whether they have already boy-
cotted in the past (yes/no; 40% answered yes) and their attitude
toward boycotting, as in Study 1 (Sen et al. 2001; a¼ .94; M¼
4.20, SD¼ 1.47). Finally, participants answered the multi-item
scale of political ideology as in Study 1 (Kidwell, Farmer, and
Hardesty 2013; a ¼ .70; M ¼ 3.53, SD ¼ 1.40). Seven parti-
cipants scored more than 3 SDs on the multi-item scale of
political ideology and were therefore not considered.
Results
The manipulation check confirmed that the conservative recall
task led to more conservative ideology (M ¼ 4.08) than the
liberal task (M ¼ 3.72, F(1, 388) ¼ 3.94, p ¼ .048). I also
observed a significant effect of the manipulation on the multi-
item scale of political ideology (liberal: M ¼ 3.35, conserva-
tive: M ¼ 3.71; F(1, 388) ¼ 6.61, p ¼ .01).
An analysis of variance on attitude toward boycotting with
the ideology manipulation as a fixed factor revealed a margin-
ally significant effect: opinions about boycotting were signifi-
cantly more positive in the liberal (M ¼ 4.34) than in the
conservative condition (M ¼ 4.06, F(1, 388) ¼ 3.60, p ¼
.058). This effect was not qualified by whether participants had
already boycotted in the past (p ¼ .63), which shows that the
effect of the manipulation of political ideology influenced the
attitudes toward boycotting regardless of whether participants
have joined boycotts in the past. Finally, I observed a signifi-
cant effect of measured political ideology on attitude toward
boycotting controlling for the effect of the manipulation of
political ideology (single-item scale: B ¼ .12, SE ¼ .04,
p < .01; multi-item scale: B ¼ .23, SE ¼ .05, p < .001).
Discussion
The results of Study 5 establish the causal effect of ideology on
attitude toward boycotts and show that this effect is indepen-
dent of whether participants were actual boycotters.
Study 6: The Effect of Political Ideology on
Political Activism
Study 6 tests the effect of political ideology on political acti-
vism (i.e., participation in political protests). I expect liberals to
be more likely to engage in political activism.
Method
I obtained the data set from the Measuring Morality Project of
Duke University (https://kenan.ethics.duke.edu/attitudes/
resources/measuring-morality/); it contains 1,519 respondents
randomly sampled from a panel representative of the U.S. pop-
ulation (Mage ¼ 50 years; 51% female). Respondents indicated
their political ideology on a seven-point scale (1 ¼ “extremely
liberal,” and 7 ¼ “extremely conservative”); M ¼ 4.21, SD ¼
1.46). They also indicated whether they have attended a polit-
ical protest or rally in the past 12 months (1¼ yes, 0¼ no; M¼
.04, SD ¼ .20). This item served as the measure of political
activism (1,474 respondents answered both the political ideol-
ogy and the political activism measures).
The data also contained responses to the Moral Founda-
tions Sacredness Scale, an alternative measure of moral foun-
dations (Graham and Haidt 2012). This scale contains 18
items asking respondents to indicate how much money they
would require to perform actions that violate the five moral
foundations in three ways (e.g., for harm: “Kick a dog in the
head”). The scale has eight points and ranges from US$0 to
US$1 million, increasing by a factor of ten, ending with
“never for any amount of money.” It is scored as the number
of times that participants answer “never for any amount of
money.” The scale has 3 filler items used to subtract the scores
on the moral foundations to partial out the tendency to refuse
doing things for money. I computed the scores of sacralization
of individualizing (M ¼ 3.47, SD ¼ 1.56) and binding moral
values (M ¼ 4.68, SD ¼ 2.22).
Results
I logistically regressed political activism on political ideology
and found a marginally significant effect (B ¼ .16, SE ¼ .09,
Wald w2 ¼ 3.11, p ¼ .078), qualified by a quadratic term (B ¼
.16, SE¼ .04, Wald w2¼ 12.88, p< .001). The positive sign of
this effect shows that the negative effect of political ideology is
stronger among those who score at the low end of the scale (i.e.,
liberals). Post hoc comparisons revealed that the tendency to
engage in political activism was more pronounced among
respondents holding an extreme ideology relative to those with
a moderate ideology (scale midpoint 4). Specifically, I
observed a negative effect of political ideology among those
on the liberal end of the scale (less than 5; B¼.65, SE¼ .16,
Wald w2 ¼ 16.45, p < .001), and a positive effect of political
ideology among those on the conservative end of the scale
(more than 3; B ¼ .36, SE ¼ .17, Wald w2 ¼ 4.54, p ¼
.033). Figure 6 shows the actual average likelihood of political
activism as a function of political ideology.
The zero-order effect of political ideology on sacralization
of individualizing moral values was not significant (B ¼ .02,
SE ¼ .03, p ¼ .56). However, controlling for sacralization of
binding moral values, the partial effect of political ideology on
sacralization of individualizing moral values was significant (B
¼ .10, SE ¼ .02, p < .001). The zero-order effect of political
ideology on sacralization of binding moral values was signif-
icant (B¼ .29, SE¼ .04, p< .001), as well as the partial effect
controlling for sacralization of individualizing moral values (B
¼ .28, SE ¼ .03, p< .001). This is consistent with Graham and
Haidt (2012), in which the effect of political ideology on sacra-
lization of individualizing values is weaker than on sacraliza-
tion of binding values. Conservatives seem to be less willing to
violate moral values in general. The correlation between sacra-
lization of individualizing and binding moral values was strong
(r ¼ .57, p < .001), which is consistent with the notion that the
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Moral Foundations Sacredness Scale measures not only moral
priorities, but the tendency to violate moral values in general.
Therefore, I controlled for the scores on the binding values to
account for general differences in sacralization of moral values.
When I included the sacralization scores of individualizing
and of binding values as predictors of political activism con-
trolling for the effect of political ideology, the results show an
effect of sacralization of individualizing values (B¼ .25, SE ¼
.11, Wald w2 ¼ 4.87, p ¼ .027) and of binding values (B ¼
.16, SE ¼ .07, Wald w2 ¼ 4.44, p ¼ .035).
Finally, I estimated mediation models using PROCESS
(model 4; 10,000 samples; 95% confidence intervals; Hayes,
2018) to test the indirect effects controlling for the sacralization
of the other moral values. The results confirm the indirect
effects of political ideology on political activism through sacra-
lization of individualizing values (a ¼ .025, SE ¼ .013, 95%
CI¼ [.058,.004]), and of binding values (a¼.043, SE¼
.022, 95% CI ¼ [.090, .003]).
Discussion
The results of Study 6 extend the analysis to political activism
more broadly. Extremists are more likely to engage in political
activism relative to moderates. In addition, liberals are partic-
ularly more likely to engage in political activism. The heigh-
tened likelihood of liberals to engage in political activism is
explained by their stronger individualizing moral values.
Study 7: Political Ideology and Google
Searches
Study 7 tests whether the effect of political ideology on boy-
cotting extends to online searches of conservative and liberal
U.S. counties. The millions of searches on Google represent
the interests of individuals in a certain geographical area
(Ginsberg et al. 2009; Ordabayeva and Fernandes 2018).
Therefore, I expected political orientation in a certain area
to predict the search level for the terms “boycott” and
“buycott” in that area.
I analyzed Google searches in the United States over the
15 years between January 2004 and June 2020, which
yielded approximately 6 million searches for “boycott” and
about 200,000 for “buycott.” I extracted the search index at
the U.S. metropolitan area level from Google Trends (from
0 to 100) and obtained political ideology using Tausano-
vitch and Warshaw’s (2014) city-level score of conserva-
tism. I then matched search index and political ideology for
107 cities. One search index for boycott and two search
indexes for buycott were 3 SDs from the mean and were
therefore not considered. The search index for boycott
(M ¼ 62.75, SD ¼ 8.43) was more pronounced than for
buycott (M ¼ 7.30, SD ¼ 13.59; F(1, 103) ¼ 1,419.04,
p < .001).
Conservatism in a given city is negatively related to the
search level for the term “boycott” in that area (B ¼ 6.71,
SE ¼ 2.94, p ¼ .025) and for the term “buycott” in that area (B
¼ 25.21, SE ¼ 4.20, p < .01), which suggests that the pre-
valence of liberals in a given city predicts interest in boycott
and buycott in that city. These results complement the previous
findings by examining the effect of political ideology on inter-
est in boycotts and buycotts in the field using city-level ideol-
ogy and Google searches in that area.
General Discussion
This research finds that political ideology affects consumers’
attitudes, interest, and actions toward boycotting and buycot-











































Figure 6. Study 6 results: political activism as a function of right-wing orientation.
Notes: Political activism was whether respondents attended a political protest or rally in the past 12 months (1 ¼ yes, 0 ¼ no). Political ideology was a single item
ranging from 1 (“extremely liberal”) to 7 (“extremely conservative”). The y-axis shows the actual average likelihood of political activism in each point of the
political ideology scale in the x-axis.
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engage in these behaviors. Nine studies show that liberals and
conservatives engage in boycotts and buycotts that are associ-
ated with their unique moral values. In addition, individualiz-
ing moral values predict a more positive attitude toward
boycotts, and this explains the greater tendency of liberals to
boycott and buycott.
Studies 1 and 2 show that liberals and conservatives have
opposing reactions when companies take a stance on politically
contentious issues. Study 3 shows that liberals are more likely
to boycott and buycott because they have stronger concerns
about the harm and the fairness dimensions of morality. Lib-
erals are more sensitive to the suffering of others and to unfair
treatment. As a result, they report they are more favorable
toward boycotting in general. In addition, the studies uncover
the rarer cases in which conservatives also engage in boycotts
and buycotts: when firms violate or promote binding moral
values, respectively. Study 4 generalizes the effect to boycotts
around the world. Study 5 shows the causal effect of political
ideology on attitude toward boycotting. When a liberal identity
is made accessible, people become more favorable toward boy-
cotts. Study 6 extends the results to political activism more
broadly. Political extremists are more likely to engage in polit-
ical activism, liberal extremists particularly so. Study 7 shows
that the effect of political ideology extends to interest in boy-
cotting and buycotting in online searches. The effect of
political ideology was tested with established measures and a
well-grounded manipulation of ideology developed in previous
research, actual, attitudinal, and interest toward boycotts and
buycotts in controlled and real-world settings, and across dif-
ferent samples (MTurk respondents in the United States, Pro-
lific Academic respondents in the United Kingdom and
worldwide, a representative sample of the U.S. population from
the Measuring Morality Project and worldwide from the World
Values Survey, and city-level aggregate data from Google).
Theoretical Implications
This article identifies the effects and mechanisms of political
ideology on boycotting and buycotting. The greater alignment
with harm and fairness moral values among liberals helps
explain why they hold more favorable attitudes toward boycot-
ting, which in turn drive their heightened tendency to boycott
and buycott in the marketplace. In addition, the present
research shows that conservatives also engage in boycotts and
buycotts, albeit less frequently, when they are associated with
binding moral values (firms associating with violation or pro-
motion of moral values of authority, loyalty, or purity).
These findings contribute to the understanding of consumer
motivations to join boycotts and buycotts by showing that con-
sideration of moral values is a key reason. According to moral
foundations theory, the main function of morality is to promote
cooperation (Curry 2016) and “to suppress or regulate selfish-
ness to make social life possible” (Haidt and Kesebir 2010, p.
800). Consistent with this view, the present research shows that
morality serves to mobilize consumers’ collective efforts to
protect and promote their moral values in the marketplace. The
results show that the consumers’ differing tendencies to boy-
cott and buycott are not simply because of identification with a
liberal or conservative ideology, but instead represent differ-
ences in the morality associated with these ideologies. How
people prioritize various moral values helps explain political
differences in boycotting and buycotting and aids understand-
ing and communication between people with different political
ideologies.
It will be important for future studies to determine whether
the growing polarization of political opinions can account for
the parallel increase in boycotting in recent years. Politically
polarized individuals are more reactive to corporate actions.
Political extremism seems to be growing, in part because of a
lack of understanding about public policies (Fernbach et al.
2013). Although consumers are exposed to a great deal of
information about companies’ practices through social media,
this information may not be reliable or processed diligently. As
such, the decision to join boycotts and buycotts is influenced by
moral reasoning, which is most often shaped by affective pro-
cesses that guide judgments in favor of a desired conclusion
(Ditto, Pizarro, and Tannenbaum 2009). In this sense, people
tend to act more like intuitive lawyers than intuitive scientists
(Haidt 2007).
In addition, people affiliate with others with whom they
share the same political identity. Motyl (2014) found that peo-
ple living in communities that voted against their candidate in
the U.S. presidential election were likely to move to a new
community that voted more heavily for their candidate. People
tend to live in politically segregated neighborhoods and partic-
ipate in similar boycotts and buycotts as their neighbors. There-
fore, they may have little opportunity to interact with others of
the opposite political ideology, not only in social media, but in
real life, which may intensify political polarization.
The findings show that it is important to account for liberals
and conservatives’ differing moral values to understand boy-
cotts and buycotts and find common ground between people of
opposing ideological convictions. Moral foundations lie at the
basis of boycotting attitudes and actions. Because morality is
guided by intuition, the reconciliation between liberals and
conservatives is possible if each group would consider the
moral foundations of their behavior. Analytic and reflective
processes can suppress intuitions in moral decision making
(Kahane et al. 2015). Although intuitions form the basis of
moral judgments, political agreement can be reached with ana-
lytic thinking (Yilmaz and Saribay 2017). Ideological camps
can reach agreement if the two sides would consider the moral
underpinnings of the behavior of others who hold different
political opinions and that their moral values are of equal
importance.
Future research could also examine the role of moral iden-
tity in shaping liberals’ and conservatives’ boycotting and buy-
cotting actions (Aquino and Reed 2002). Specifically,
consumers may be more prone to boycotting and buycotting
when morality is a key part of their identity. The present
research shows that boycotts and buycotts are influenced by
consumers’ moral concerns and are indeed more likely among
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those who hold stronger moral values. Moral identity can there-
fore be a key contingency factor that makes liberals and con-
servatives boycott and buycott. When people’s moral identities
are made more accessible or salient by the environment, people
may be more likely to engage in political action.
Future longitudinal studies may examine how nonboycotters
become boycotters and the effects of political ideology and
moral values over time. The present research involved obser-
ving a cross-section of people whose moral concerns were
already integrated with political ideology and shows that moral
foundations are the key factors that explain boycotting and
buycotting behaviors. However, people have initial moral incli-
nations, which can lead to identification with a political party
or group. The relationship between political ideology and
moral values over time is a process of complex mutual influ-
ence involving interactions with genetic predispositions and
environmental factors (Alford, Funk, and Hibbing 2005). In
addition, future longitudinal studies could investigate other
models including how participation in boycotts can engender
participation in more boycotts over time.
Future research should also examine cross-level interactions
between individual and cultural propensities to boycott and
buycott. Recent research shows that boycotts are less common
in tight cultures than in loose ones (Gelfand et al. 2011). Rela-
tive to loose cultures, tight ones are more likely to have auto-
cratic governing systems, more laws and controls, and greater
adherence to social norms. In such an environment, collective
political action may be suppressed. Future research would ben-
efit from a multilevel perspective to consider both individuals’
predispositions and their social context.
Boycotting and buycotting reflect movement toward a more
agentic form of political participation embedded in consumers’
daily lives. Overall, the present study shows that it is important
to consider the moral foundations of boycotts and buycotts. It
supports the importance of moral values in driving consumers’
political behavior. The conclusion is that much research
remains to be studied, and this research can provide impetus
for future work on understanding consumer political activism.
Practical Implications for Companies
The present findings have useful implications for marketers.
First, they inform marketers that liberal consumers are more
likely to engage in boycotts and buycotts. Therefore, boycotts
and buycotts are likely to be more prevalent in areas and seg-
ments characterized by a greater concentration of liberals (e.g.,
California, northeastern United States). Recently, a sports store
in Colorado that boycotted Nike over the Colin Kaepernick
campaign was forced to close after 21 years in business (Horton
2019), which shows that taking a stance on politically charged
issues can be damaging if customers are against it (as liberals
are in the case of boycotting Nike).
The results also suggest that marketing campaigns addres-
sing harm and fairness moral issues may be more successful.
“Fair Trade,” “Not Tested on Animals,” “Equal Pay Day,” and
“Against Racial Injustice” are some of the campaigns that have
prompt consumers to act politically by addressing harm and
justice moral values. Although there may be a backlash against
these campaigns among conservatives, the net outcome of
these campaigns is likely to be positive given that these cam-
paigns do not address binding moral values. Furthermore, these
campaigns may fare better in politically liberal states and
locations.
Polarized political opinions drive companies to refrain from
weighing into the political arena (Mittal, Malshe, and Sridhar
2018). About 80% of chief marketing officers believe that their
brands should not “take a stance on politically-charged issues,”
even though about 50% agree with “allowing employees to
speak out on political issues” and with “making changes to
products and services in response to political issues” (CMO
Survey 2020). This suggests that perhaps marketing managers
believe in the importance of corporate political activism but are
unwilling to use it strategically given the risk of alienating
some customers.
The present article provides some guidance to avoid polar-
ized reactions of customers. For instance, some corporate
political actions are particularly divisive, such as Nike’s Kae-
pernick campaign, as it addressed both individualizing moral
values of equal rights to ethnic minorities and binding moral
values of respect to the national anthem and flag. In addition,
some issues are more divisive than others. For instance, illegal
immigration and gun controls are particularly polarizing, as
they appeal to both the individualizing moral values of harm
and care and the binding moral values of social order and
cohesion. Companies may refrain from those issues if they
are not willing to target a specific political group. However, it
is possible for companies to appeal to the moral values of
liberals and conservatives without hurting their counterparts.
For instance, equal rights and protection of animals are indi-
vidualizing moral issues the liberals more strongly support,
but conservatives do not generally oppose; similarly, patrio-
tism and respect for traditions are binding moral issues the
conservatives strongly support, but liberals do not generally
oppose. Companies that target less polarizing issues may not
be rejected as strongly by the disapproving segments of a
politically divided customer base.
Practical Implications for Policy
Voters who are disaffected by the politicians in power may turn
to consumer political actions in part because of being frustrated
with the political system. Trust in the U.S. government is at
historic lows (Pew Research Center 2019). Politicians who
strongly appeal to moral values may frustrate supporters during
their mandates when they are forced to compromise. They also
alienate part of the electorate who do not see themselves as
being represented. This frustration with politics and institutions
may have contributed to the rise of boycotts and buycotts and
extra-parliamentary movements in recent years. In addition,
consumers can nowadays be more vocal about their opinions
and spread information about boycotts and buycotts online
through social media. Companies may therefore feel some
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pressure to take a stance on politically charged issues. The
current state of hyperpolitical polarization accelerates this
dynamic even further.
Consumer political actions can drive attention to societal
problems by emphasizing individualizing and binding moral
values. For instance, inequality has soared to unprecedented
levels in the United States and worldwide (Atkinson, Piketty,
and Saez 2011), and the preferences of powerful people are
more likely to be translated to legislation (Gilens 2005). The
needs of less powerful people can be made heard through con-
sumer political actions. Consumers can for instance favor com-
panies that provide more charity donations and social programs
for impoverished populations. The reduction of inequality and
protection of vulnerable individuals is more appealing to indi-
vidualizing moral values.
Another current political problem is that the internationali-
zation and financialization of operations might have reduced
pressure on companies to provide for their communities. Con-
sumer political actions can demand that companies provide a
positive contribution to society, including the communities in
which they operate and are headquartered. The retribution of
companies to the communities they are based is more appealing
to binding moral values.
Consumers can therefore spur a positive change by expres-
sing their moral values through their purchases. This collective
consumer endeavor may improve our society. Companies may
be forced to respond. As Adam Smith noted (1776/1976, pp.
26–27), “it is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the
brewer, or the baker that we expect our dinner, but from their
regard to their own interest.”
The understanding of moral foundations can also improve
political representation. Partisanship induces people to demo-
nize the other side and to be against to whatever they propose.
Politicians should set the example for the respectful behavior of
citizens, who should in turn reward politicians who work across
political boundaries. If politicians recognize the importance of
protection of individual rights, and of social order, rather than
pitting one against the other, we may advance on both. The
democratic principle requires people to listen to the other side
in order to address contentious issues. Politics is not like a team
sport. People should value mutual discussion to have a better
functioning society.
Conclusion
Participation in boycotts and buycotts among liberals and con-
servatives is the result of their moral priorities. While boycotts
and buycotts are observed at both ends of the political spec-
trum, they are more prevalent among liberals than among con-
servatives. Liberals boycott and buycott to promote
individualizing moral values that protect individual rights and
conditions, whereas conservatives boycott and buycott in rarer
cases to promote binding moral values that protect their inner
circles. The differential distribution of moral concern explains
the consumer political actions of liberals and conservatives,
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Fehr, Ernst and Simon Gächter (2000), “Cooperation and Punishment
in Public Goods Experiments,” American Economic Review, 90
(4), 980–94.
Feinberg, Matthew, Alexa M. Tullett, Zachary Mensch, William Hart,
and Sara Gottlieb (2017), “The Political Reference Point: How
Geography Shapes Political Identity,” PLoS ONE, 12 (2),
e0171497.
Fernandes, Daniel and Naomi Mandel (2014), “Political Conservatism
and Variety-Seeking,” Journal of Consumer Psychology, 24 (1),
79–86.
Fernbach, Philip M., Todd Rogers, Craig R. Fox, and Steven A.
Sloman (2013), “Political Extremism Is Supported by an Illusion
of Understanding,” Psychological Science, 24 (6), 939–46.
Fowler, James H. and Cindy Kam (2007). “Beyond the Self: Social
Identity, Altruism, and Political Participation,” Journal of Politics,
69 (3), 813–27.
Fraley, R. Chris, Brian N. Griffin, Jay Belsky, and Glenn I. Roisman
(2012), “Developmental Antecedents of Political Ideology: A
Longitudinal Investigation from Birth to Age 18,” Psychological
Science, 23 (11), 1425–31.
Gelfand, Michele, Jana L. Raver, Lisa Nishii, Lisa M. Leslie, Janetta
Lun, Beng Chong Lim, et al. (2011), “Differences Between Tight
and Loose Cultures: A 33-Nation Study,” Science, 332 (6033),
1100–04.
Gilens, Martin (2005), “Inequality and Democratic Responsiveness,”
Public Opinion Quarterly, 69 (5), 778–96.
Ginsberg, Jeremy, Matthew H. Mohebbi, Rajan S. Patel, Lynnette
Brammer, Mark S. Smolinski, and Larry Brilliant (2009),
“Detecting Influenza Epidemics Using Search Engine Query
Data,” Nature, 457 (7232), 1012–14.
Graham, Jesse, and Jonathan Haidt (2012), “Sacred Values and Evil
Adversaries: A Moral Foundations Approach,” in Herzliya Series
on Personality and Social Psychology. The Social Psychology of
Morality: Exploring the Causes of Good and Evil, M. Mikulincer
and P. R. Shaver, eds. Washington, DC: American Psychological
Association, 11–31.
Graham, Jesse, Jonathan Haidt, Sena Koleva, Matt Motyl, Ravi Iyer,
Sean P. Wojcik, and Peter H. Ditto (2013), “Moral Foundations
Theory: The Pragmatic Validity of Moral Pluralism,” Advances in
Experimental Social Psychology, 47, 55–130.
Graham, Jesse, Jonathan Haidt, and Brian A. Nosek (2009), “Liberals
and Conservatives Rely on Different Sets of Moral Foundations,”
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 96 (5), 1029–46.
Haidt, J. (2007). “The New Synthesis in Moral Psychology,” Science,
316 (5827), 998–1002.
Haidt, Jonathan (2001), “The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail: A
Social Intuitionist Approach to Moral Judgment,” Psychological
Review, 108 (4), 814–34.
Haidt, Jonathan and Jesse Graham (2007), “When Morality Opposes
Justice: Conservatives Have Moral Intuitions that Liberals May
Not Recognize,” Social Justice Research, 20 (1), 98–116.
Haidt, Jonathan and Craig Joseph (2004), “Intuitive Ethics: How
Innately Prepared Intuitions Generate Culturally Variable
Virtues,” Daedalus, 133 (4), 55–66.
Haidt, Jonathan and Selin Kesebir (2010), “Morality,” in Handbook of
Social Psychology, 5th ed., S. Fiske, D. Gilbert and G. Lindzey,
eds. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, 797–832.
Hayes, A. F. (2018), Introduction to Mediation, Moderation, and Con-
ditional Process Analysis, 2nd ed. New York: The Guilford Press.
Henrich, Joseph, Steven J. Heine, and Ara Norenzayan (2010), “The
Weirdest People in the World?” Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 33
(2–3), 61–135.
Horton, Adrian (2019), “Sports Store that Boycotted Nike over Colin




Janoff-Bulman, Ronnie (2009), “To Provide or Protect: Motivational
Bases of Political Liberalism and Conservatism,” Psychological
Inquiry, 20 (2–3), 120–28.
John, Andrew and Jill G. Klein (2003), “The Boycott Puzzle: Con-
sumer Motivations for Purchase Sacrifice,” Management Science,
49 (9), 1196–209.
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